Habitual prospective memory in schizophrenia by Elvevåg, Brita et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Psychiatry
Open Access Research article
Habitual prospective memory in schizophrenia
Brita Elvevåg*1, Elizabeth A Maylor2 and Abigail L Gilbert1
Address: 1Clinical Brain Disorders Branch, NIMH/NIH, Bldg. 10, Rm. 4S235, MSC 1379, Bethesda MD, 20892, USA and 2Department of 
Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK
Email: Brita Elvevåg* - elvevaab@intra.nimh.nih.gov; Elizabeth A Maylor - E.A.Maylor@warwick.ac.uk; Abigail L Gilbert - gilberta@mail.nih.gov
* Corresponding author    
Episodic memoryWorking memorySource memory
Abstract
Background: Prospective memory (PM), the act of remembering that something has to be done
in the future without any explicit prompting to recall, provides a useful framework with which to
examine problems in internal-source monitoring. This is because it requires distinguishing between
two internally-generated processes, namely the intention to perform an action versus actual
performance of the action. In habitual tasks, such as taking medicine every few hours, the same PM
task is performed regularly and thus it is essential that the individual is able to distinguish thoughts
(i.e., thinking about taking the medicine) from actions (i.e., actually taking the medicine).
Methods: We assessed habitual PM in patients with schizophrenia by employing a laboratory
analogue of a habitual PM task in which, concurrently with maneuvering a ball around an obstacle
course (ongoing activity), participants were to turn over a counter once during each trial (PM task).
After each trial, participants were asked whether they had remembered to turn the counter over.
Results: Patients with schizophrenia made a disproportionate number of errors compared to
controls of reporting that a PM response had been made (i.e., the counter turned over) after an
omission error (i.e., the counter was not turned over). There was no group difference in terms of
reporting that an omission error occurred (i.e., forgetting to turn over the counter) when in fact
a PM response had been made.
Conclusion: Patients with schizophrenia displayed a specific deficit distinguishing between two
internally-generated sources, attributable to either poor source monitoring or temporal
discrimination.
Background
Prospective memory (PM) may be defined as remember-
ing that something has to be done at some point in the
future, without any prompting in the form of explicit
recall instructions. PM has become of increasing interest
to psychologists and neuropsychologists because of its
central importance in maintaining function in everyday
life, such as remembering to take one's medicine every few
hours. PM contrasts with retrospective memory (RM) in
which one remembers information from the past, such as
remembering the name of the new patient who has just
been admitted to the ward. Clearly all PM tasks have an
RM component (see [1] for discussion). For instance, one
could fail the PM task of passing a message on to a friend
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when you next see him/her either because of forgetting
the intention to pass on the message (a PM failure) or
because of forgetting the details of the message (an RM
failure). However, the usual goal of PM studies is to min-
imize the RM component, such that task performance is
predominantly determined by PM (for a review, see [2]).
It is probably of most use to envisage PM as referring to a
set of behaviors (including non-mnestic cognitive proc-
esses) that enable one to realize a delayed intention,
rather than as a separate memory module (see [3,4]). Per-
formance on a PM task typically includes the encoding of
an intention, retaining the information, executing the
intention, and then evaluating the outcome (this last
component being the primary focus in the current study).
Patients with schizophrenia present with a wide range of
cognitive deficits, especially in the domain of memory
(for reviews, see [5–7]). PM is of interest here because it
represents a possible framework (and one that is ecologi-
cally based) within which to examine the possible contri-
bution of memory processes that are thought to be
compromised in schizophrenia. Confusion about the
source of an action or a thought has been suggested to
underlie some symptoms observed in schizophrenia (e.g.,
[8–11]). Furthermore, it has been shown that there is a
relationship between reality monitoring errors and disor-
ganized thinking in schizophrenia, with thought disor-
dered schizophrenic patients experiencing problems
differentiating information that they had spoken from
that which they had merely thought [12]. Indeed, actions
that are often thought about pose potential problems for
internal-source monitoring. This is because one must be
able to distinguish thoughts from actions. Previous stud-
ies in which schizophrenic patients have been required to
judge whether processes were from an internal source ver-
sus from an external source found that patients, especially
those with hallucinations, tend to misattribute internal
events to external sources [13–18] [see also [19–22]]. Dis-
tinguishing between two internal sources should surely be
a difficult task, and this may be especially the case in
schizophrenia. Indeed, performance on a task that focuses
only on distinguishing between two internally-generated
sources may shed more light on whether the theoretical
notion of confusion between actual and imagined events
(see [23]) has empirical support in patients with
schizophrenia.
By definition PM places a heavy demand on self-initiated
retrieval in the absence of any external prompts or cues
from the environment [1]. However, an important dis-
tinction has been drawn between time-based and event-
based PM tasks [24], with the former placing heavier
demands on self-initiated retrieval in comparison with the
latter. This is because in time-based tasks, such as remem-
bering to make a telephone call at 20:00, there are few
environmental triggers and thus one has to monitor time
effectively in order to respond at the appropriate moment;
in contrast, in event-based tasks, such as remembering to
make a telephone call when a television programme is
over, one can rely on the target event itself acting as the
cue to initiate PM performance. In the present study, we
chose a time-based PM task in order to maximize the
amount of self-initiated retrieval required by participants
to perform successfully. Furthermore, we were interested
specifically in habitual PM (such as taking medicines
every 4 hours) in which the same PM task has to be done
on a regular basis. In habitual PM tasks, such as the one
employed in the current study (based on [2], which was
itself adapted from [25]; see also [26]), the measure of
interest is participants' ability to evaluate the outcome
(i.e., whether or not the PM task has been carried out
successfully).
Two main 'action' errors may arise in such a task: (1)
omission errors – in which the PM task is not carried out,
and (2) repetition errors – in which the PM task is incor-
rectly repeated. Omission errors may occur because of
mistaking thinking about an action with the actual per-
formance of the action (i.e., output/reality monitoring
error [27]), or mistakenly thinking that one has per-
formed an action because one erroneously recalls the
memory of performing that action from a previous occa-
sion (temporal discrimination error [28]). Repetition
errors may arise because one forgets that one already per-
formed that action (i.e., output/reality monitoring error),
or because one might remember that one performed the
action but attribute the memory to a previous occasion
rather than to the current time (temporal discrimination
error).
Evaluation of the outcome of a PM task can be investi-
gated by asking the participant after a PM trial to say
whether or not the action was successfully carried out on
that trial. Thus there are two possible 'evaluation' errors:
(1) If a PM response was not made (i.e., an omission
error) but the participant incorrectly reported that the
action was performed successfully, we denote this evalua-
tion error as 'Action-no/Report-yes'. (2) If a PM response
was made but the participant incorrectly reported that the
action was omitted, we denote this evaluation error as
'Action-yes/Report-no'.
The first question of interest in the current study was
whether there would be a deficit in patients with schizo-
phrenia in comparison with normal healthy controls in
the performance of a habitual PM task. Although we are
unaware of any published studies of PM in schizophrenia,
our prediction based on deficits in other memory
domains was that action errors (i.e., omissions and repe-
titions) would be greater in the patients. The secondBMC Psychiatry 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/3/9
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important question addressed here was whether the pat-
terns of outcome evaluation errors would be different in
patients with schizophrenia, as compared to healthy con-
trols. Working memory is presumably crucial for holding
the intended action in mind, scheduling the sequences of
responses and monitoring the execution of those
responses [29]. Patients with schizophrenia have been
shown to have working memory problems [30–37]. Thus,
we predicted that these patients would display problems
concurrently holding in mind the PM task while conduct-
ing ongoing activity (which at some point has to be inter-
rupted in order to execute the PM task) in addition to
retaining information on the status of the PM task for sub-
sequent outcome evaluation. We therefore expected
greater numbers of evaluation errors (i.e., discrepancies
between actions and reports of actions) in patients.
Methods
Participants and Baseline Tests
In- and out-patients from the National Institute of Mental
Health research wards participated in this study (n = 20).
All patients fulfilled DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia, as
determined by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (SCID) with three psychiatrists reaching a consensus
diagnosis. Patients generally had multiple hospital admis-
sions due to incomplete responses to conventional treat-
ments. Normal healthy control volunteers were recruited
through the National Institutes of Health volunteer panel
(n = 20). No participant, control or patient, with a history
of traumatic brain injury, epilepsy, developmental disor-
der, diagnosable current substance dependence, or other
known neurological condition was included in this study.
All participants had normal or normal corrected vision.
Control participants were paid for their participation. The
study was approved by the internal review board at the
National Institute of Mental Health and informed consent
was obtained from all participants prior to testing.
Table 1 shows the mean ages and scores on background
tests of the patients and controls, and the medication
details for the patients. Two baseline tests were used to
index intellectual function. The first was a test of reading
proficiency – the Wide Range Achievement Test – Revised
(WRAT-R [38]), which is widely used as a putative meas-
ure of premorbid intellectual functioning [39–41]. The
second was a short version of the Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R [42]; see also [43,44]. The
substantial drop in intelligence from estimated premor-
bid function that we observed is often reported in schizo-
phrenia [45]. Digit span was assessed using the Wechsler
Memory Scale-Revised [46].
Design and Procedure
The ongoing activity was a commercial battery-powered
game ("Kongman"; TOMY Toy Corporation, 1982) in
which a steel ball was to be moved around an obstacle
course by pressing a button at the appropriate time points
in order to open or close certain routes through which the
ball could travel. Each game lasted 90 seconds, and partic-
ipants were instructed to accumulate as many points as
possible during each game until the time was up. The
game commenced by each participant winding a timer at
the base of the game. During the course of the game the
timer moved from the start to the finish position (taking
90 seconds). The rim surround of the timer was covered
and colored with red and green colored paper, such that
the first 25 seconds were red and the remaining 65 sec-
onds green. The PM task was to turn a counter (a poker
chip that was similar on both sides) over once during each
game. However, participants were instructed to turn the
Table 1: Characteristics of Patient and Control Samples
Patients n = 20 (18 M, 2 F) Controls n = 20 (14 M, 6 F) Group Difference
MS D MS D
Age (years) 34.8 7.2 36.6 6.8 t(38) = 0.81, p > .1
WRAT-R IQ 102.7 10.6 105.4 8.9 t(38) = 0.85, p > .1
WAIS-R IQ 87.6 8.2 105.9 10.8 t(38) = 6.04, p < .001
Digit span: Total 13.2 3.4 18.3 4.3 t(38) = 3.81, p < .001
Digit span: Forward 7.1 1.8 9.2 2.4 t(38) = 3.03, p < .01
Digit span: Backward 6.1 2.3 9.1 2.5 t(38) = 4.02, p < .001
Neuroleptic medication 19 0
clozapine/olanzapine 14 -
risperidone 7 -
high potency drug* 1 -
anticholinergics 1 -
adjunctives** 10 -
* = haloperidol ** = lithium, depakote, sertraline, lorazepam, venlafaxine, clonazepam, buspironeBMC Psychiatry 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/3/9
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counter over only when the timer reached the green zone
(i.e., they could not respond prospectively immediately,
but had to wait for some proportion of time into the game
before responding). Participants were to play the game a
total of 10 times (i.e., 10 trials). After each of the ten
games, participants were asked if they had remembered to
turn the counter over during the game. The experimenter
employed a stopwatch to note the time at which the coun-
ter was turned over, and whether it was in the green or red
zone. The participants' response to the question concern-
ing whether they remembered to turn over the counter
was also noted. The game was sufficiently easy and enjoy-
able that participants engaged in the game and all partici-
pants performed extremely well. Because this was merely
the ongoing task in which the PM task was embedded, the
points scored in the actual game were not formally
analyzed.
Results
The data from trials 1–5 were combined, as were the data
from trials 6–10 (see [25] for a similar procedure). Num-
bers of action and evaluation errors were analyzed using
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with diagnostic group
(patients vs. controls) as a between-subjects factor and tri-
als (1–5 vs. 6–10) as the within-subjects factor. The over-
all means are summarized in Table 2.
First, we examined the numbers of action errors (omis-
sions and repetitions) in the PM task. Concerning omis-
sion errors, there was a main effect of group, F(1, 38) =
15.67, p < 0.001, with patients making more omissions
(i.e., failing to turn the counter over) than controls. There
was no significant effect of trials, F(1, 38) = 1.18, p > .1,
although there was a numerical decrease in omission
errors across the first three trials (Ms = 0.35, 0.20, and
0.13), with omission errors remaining relatively stable (M
= 0.16) thereafter. The initial decrease is presumably due
to the repeated reminder provided by the outcome evalu-
ation question after each trial. There was no significant
interaction between group and trials, F < 1. These findings
were very similar when we examined omission errors
more stringently as a function of whether the PM task of
turning the counter was done only when the dial was in
the green zone, with patients making omissions at an
average rate of 0.36 per trial and controls at 0.05 per trial.
We note that this low rate of omission errors in controls
reduces the opportunity to report a missed action as hav-
ing been performed (see later Discussion). For repetition
errors in the PM task (i.e., turning the counter over more
than once during the game), there was no significant dif-
ference between groups, F < 1, no effect of trials, F(1, 38)
= 1.12, p > .1, and no Group × Trials interaction, F < 1.
Second, we examined the numbers of outcome evaluation
errors for each participant (i.e., Action-no/Report-yes
errors, and Action-yes/Report-no errors). Concerning
Action-no/Report-yes errors, namely, reporting that a PM
response had been made (i.e., counter turned over) after
an omission error (i.e., the counter was not turned over),
patients were significantly more likely to make such errors
than controls, F(1, 38) = 4.27, p < 0.05. In other words,
patients more frequently failed to perform the PM task,
but upon questioning (i.e., evaluation) mistakenly stated
that they had made their PM response. There was no sig-
nificant effect of trials, F < 1, and no interaction between
group and trial, F  < 1. Action-yes/Response-no errors,
which refer to reporting that an omission error occurred
(i.e., forgot to turn the counter) when in fact a PM
response had been made (i.e., the counter had been
turned over) were quite rare in both groups with no signif-
icant difference between them, F < 1. There was no effect
of trials, F < 1, and no interaction, F < 1.
Finally, we examined whether the significant group differ-
ences for numbers of omission and Action-no/Report-yes
errors remained after taking into account measures of IQ
and digit span (from Table 1) using analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs). For omissions, the group effect remained
Table 2: Mean Numbers and Standard Deviations of Action and Evaluation Errors in Trials 1-5 and 6-10 in Patients and Controls
Patients Controls
Trials 1–5 Trials 6–10 Trials 1–5 Trials 6–10
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Action errors
Omissions 1.70 1.45 1.45 1.82 .25 .55 .15 .37
Repetitions .45 1.19 .65 1.27 .45 .60 .60 1.14
Evaluation errors
Action-no/ Report-yes .75 1.21 .60 1.39 .10 .31 .10 .31
Action-yes/ Report-no .10 .31 .20 .52 .10 .31 .05 .22BMC Psychiatry 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/3/9
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significant at p < .05 in separate ANCOVAs with current IQ
(WAIS-R), a putative index of premorbid IQ (WRAT-R),
forward digit span and backward digit span as a covariate.
In contrast, for Action-no/Report-yes evaluation errors,
the significant group effect disappeared when either back-
ward digit span or WAIS-R was included as a covariate (p
> .1 for the group effects in both cases), but not when for-
ward digit span or WRAT-R was included as a covariate (p
< .05 and p = .05 for the group effects, respectively).
Discussion
Many everyday memory tasks require PM, yet our under-
standing of this type of memory is greatly limited by the
paradigms with which it can be studied. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first study to show that schizophrenia is
associated with an overall impairment in habitual PM per-
formance. In our habitual PM task (based on [2], which
itself was adapted from [25]), patients with schizophrenia
were more likely to forget to perform the PM task than
were controls. Note that all participants knew that they
were to turn over the counter (and this was confirmed by
questioning at the beginning and end of the experiment).
In other words, they all knew (and remembered) what
they were required to do, but patients simply more fre-
quently forgot to do it at the appropriate time. Impor-
tantly, this action deficit could not be attributed to overall
group differences in IQ or digit span. In contrast, the
group effect for Action-no/Report-yes evaluation errors,
whereby patients more often than controls reported that
they turned the counter when they did not, was removed
by covarying either current IQ or backward digit span.
This relationship may be understood in the sense that
when participants are asked whether they remembered to
turn over the counter (the PM task) they have to sequen-
tially scan their memory and arrange items in an order
that enables them to respond to the question at hand. The
close relationship of this evaluative (RM) component of
PM to working memory is thus not surprising (cf. [29]),
and nor its relationship to a decline in current intelligence
in patients.
It should be recognized that the increase in Action-no/
Report-yes errors seen in patients is at least partly a conse-
quence of the group difference in omission errors. Indeed,
control participants made very few omission errors at all;
this may be regarded as a virtue as patients did make a
non-trivial number of mistakes on a task that was fairly
easy. Arguably, a preferable measure would be the proba-
bility of a "yes" report given that an omission had
occurred – in other words, the number of Action-no/
Report-yes responses conditionalized upon the number of
opportunities for such responses (i.e., the number of
omissions). It was not possible to compare such rates
between patients and controls in the present study
because of so few control participants (n = 5) making any
omission errors. However, it is striking that, for patients,
the mean probability of reporting that a PM response had
been successfully executed following an omission error
was 0.32 (SD = 0.42). (Three patients were excluded from
this particular analysis because of no omission errors.) In
other words, on approximately one-third of occasions on
which patients failed to perform the PM task, they never-
theless reported (incorrectly) that they had done so. This
would seem a worryingly high probability for such an
apparently simple task that posed few problems for con-
trols. Importantly, this result would suggest that patients'
self-reports of having completed a habitual PM task (e.g.,
taking medication) are likely to be particularly unreliable.
A future study assessing the ecological validity of a labora-
tory analogue of a habitual PM task may provide a useful
indicator of the likelihood of individual patients correctly
remembering to perform habitual PM tasks such as relia-
bly taking their medications.
As in both Einstein et al.'s [25] study with older adults and
Maylor et al.'s [2] study with young children, the reasons
behind such increases in output evaluation errors remain
unclear. Thus, one possibility is that patients reported
"yes" after an omission error because of a failure to mon-
itor the source, in the sense that patients thought about
turning over the counter early on in the game before it was
appropriate to respond, but then later attributed this
thought to actually performing the action. Alternatively,
patients' performance profiles may be indicative of a tem-
poral discrimination problem in that they remembered a
response from the previous game and thus thought that
this was their response in the current game. It is of course
also possible that patients have a general response bias to
say "yes". In other words, the task is to do "something"
and so when asked if they did so, they may say "yes"
because that is what is expected. However, we have no a
priori reason to assume any response bias would be qual-
itatively different to that in healthy control participants,
and moreover it is unlikely given the absence of any
reward (or feedback) conditional upon performance.
Source memory problems have been reported in normal
aging (e.g., [47]), as have PM problems [48–50]. Interest-
ingly, our current findings with schizophrenic patients are
similar to those reported (from a different task) in
patients with Alzheimer's disease (as well as older adults
as compared with younger adults) in the sense that the PM
failures were not due to forgetting the task instruction, but
rather that patients failed more frequently to carry out the
PM task as a response to the appropriate cue [51]. Taken
together, these findings suggest that general cognitive
decline may be associated with specific deficits in PM.
Indeed, the frequent thoughts and executions of actions
associated with PM tasks provide a useful empirical frame-
work for future studies to examine source monitoringBMC Psychiatry 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/3/9
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problems that may underlie certain memory problems, as
well as a variety of illusory memories, especially in
patients who are often considered to be vulnerable to
these errors. Interestingly, in situations that do encourage
false or illusory memories we have not found schizo-
phrenic patients to be disproportionately susceptible as
compared to control participants (e.g., false recognition
paradigm; Elvevåg et al. (2002); unpublished data). How-
ever, in our current study of PM in which participants had
to distinguish between two internally-generated sources,
we found that schizophrenic patients were more vulnera-
ble to a specific memory error, namely, claiming to have
completed a PM task when they have not in fact done so.
Conclusions
In conclusion, PM provides an ecologically valid and
straightforward framework within which one can explore
the nature of problems that patients have when required
to discriminate between two internally-generated proc-
esses. Future studies exploring the relationship of these
discriminatory problems to symptoms and to measures of
functional outcome promise to be informative regarding
the clinical presentation and management of
schizophrenia.
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